Two Groundwater Papers: 1) Groundwater Crisis – Effects of Self-Imposed Economic Incentives; 2) Collective Action in a Groundwater Commons – San Luis Valley, CO.
A quick perusal prompted me to post these.
1) Responding to a Groundwater Crisis: The Effects of Self-Imposed Economic Incentives bySteven M. Smith, Krister Andersson, Kelsey C. Cody, Michael Cox and Darren Ficklin.
We find that the price- intervention has been effective; leading to a 33-percent reduction in groundwater use, predominantly through reduced irrigation intensity.
Given that financial incentives can produce substantial conservation within a groundwater commons in duress, price-based policies warrant further consideration as irrigators address diminishing and variable water supplies.
Abstract: Under what conditions are irrigators able to develop adaptive governance arrangements?
This paper addresses this question by developing an empirically-grounded theory of self-governance of a snowmelt commons in Southern Colorado.
Drawing on previous work in collective action and institutional theory, we argue that self-regulation of the hydro-commons is driven by changes in shared user perceptions with regards to the salience and scarcity of the resource, as well as the perceived probability of salvaging the resource system.
Enjoy!
"Sooner or later, wittingly or unwittingly, we must pay for every intrusion on the natural environment."